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Tighter Enforcement, Larger Remittances: What Actually Changed in 2024 Flows to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract

In 2024 Russian authorities intensified checks, raids, and deportations directed at Central Asian labor migrants, while official statistics recorded double-digit growth in US-dollar remittance receipts: +45.5 percent for Tajikistan, +29.8 percent for Uzbekistan, and +18.6 percent net and +10.5 percent gross for Kyrgyzstan. Contemporary reporting paired that growth with a reported halving of the registered Kyrgyz migrant population in Russia and explained it by wage gains among those who stayed. We ask what pre-cutoff evidence establishes about that pairing for each country. The composition of recorded flows changed, in instruments and in geography. Using primary monthly and channel data from the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, we difference the 2024 increment rather than approximate it. The channel levels the bank publishes directly show that peer-to-peer card transfers supplied 58.2 percent of the USD 3.424 billion increase, against 29.9 percent for traditional money-transfer systems and 11.9 percent for SWIFT, with no recorded channel contracting. In the two countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split, Russia's recorded share fell while its absolute contribution rose; the Kyrgyz series runs across 2020, 2022 and 2024, the Uzbek comparison across 2023 and 2024. One limit defines how far the evidence reaches. The official migrant counts rest on descriptions of the counted population that differ from one another and are nowhere defined in the reviewed corpus, so no defensible per-migrant calculation can be built from them, and no reviewed source carries a composition split for Tajikistan. The measurable change is in instruments and in source countries, not in the migrant population the reported pairing invokes.

Keywords: remittances; labor migration; Russia; Central Asia; transfer channels; migration statistics; Tajikistan; Uzbekistan; Kyrgyzstan

1. Introduction

Russia tightened enforcement against Central Asian labor migrants through 2024. After the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, authorities in several Russian cities increased document checks, workplace raids, and dismissals, and job-search activity by Tajik and Uzbek nationals in St. Petersburg reportedly fell by 60 and 40 percent respectively from April 2024 (Ibragimova, 2024). Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs administrative statistics transcribed by IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025, p. 12) record twice as many unplanned migration inspections from January to October 2024 as in the same period of 2023, 77 percent more violations identified, 149,200 deportation orders, and entry bans on 208,000 individuals.

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Official 2024 remittance statistics moved the other way in all three of the region's most remittance-dependent economies. Tajikistan's remittances grew 45.5 percent year-on-year and reached about 49 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2025). Uzbekistan's total inflows rose 29.8 percent to USD 14.8 billion (Gazeta.uz, 2025, citing the Central Bank of Uzbekistan). Kyrgyzstan's net inflow rose 18.6 percent and its gross inflow 10.5 percent (Xinhua, 2025, citing the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic).

Contemporary reporting closed the gap between these two facts with a third. On 30 December 2024 the Kyrgyz foreign minister told a year-end press conference that Russian Interior Ministry data showed 650,000 Kyrgyz migrants registered in 2023 and 350,000 officially recorded at the end of 2024 (Kabar, 2024). Several outlets paired that halving with the rising remittance figures and attributed the combination to higher wages earned by the migrants who remained.

This paper asks the question that pairing raises, for each of the three countries separately: given tighter enforcement and reported falls in registered migrant counts, is the 2024 rise in dollar remittances an artifact of measurement or currency conversion, or does it reflect a real change in how and from where remittances flow? We keep all three countries in view because they share the exposure that makes the question worth asking, namely heavy dependence on Russia-sourced transfers under a common enforcement shock, while differing in exactly the respect that determines how far the question can be answered: how much of their statistics the reviewed sources carry.

The answer has a positive core. Where the composition of recorded flows can be measured, it changed, and it changed in ways the wage story does not anticipate. Uzbekistan's increment was booked overwhelmingly through peer-to-peer card transfers rather than through the traditional money-transfer systems that dominate the stock of flows, and both countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split show Russia's share falling while its absolute contribution rises. These are changes in instruments and in geography. The change the reported pairing asserts, in the migrant population doing the remitting, is the one the evidence cannot deliver, because the official counts conflict among themselves by factors of 2.28 and 2.57 within a single country-year.

Our contribution relative to the closest accounts is specific. Pre-cutoff reporting had already juxtaposed the Kyrgyz halving with rising remittances and proposed migrant wage growth (Kabar, 2024), and an institutional account had done the same: the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, pp. 11, 13) sets a 40 percent decline in Kyrgyz migrant numbers in Russia against a 17 percent rise in remittances from Russia and proposes two mechanisms, a smaller but better-established workforce and an active response to ruble depreciation. Both accounts cover one country, neither decomposes the increment, and neither checks whether the two series can be compared. IOM's three country reports transcribe stock and remittance figures within a single document each; IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 9) flags that the Russian ministry's count of Uzbek nationals far exceeds its own Migration Agency figure without resolving the gap, and none of the three decomposes the 2024 increment. World Bank (2024) warns that registered counts "may be a major undercount" and that naturalization moves transfers outside the cross-border perimeter, but for 2023 and without joining the two series. World Bank (2025) attributes the Tajik surge to economic activity and real wage growth in Russia without placing it against stock or channel data. Frankel (2009) is the nearest academic reference: he normalizes bilateral remittances by the lagged migrant stock, which makes a stable stock series a precondition for the per-migrant reasoning the press accounts perform. What no source we identified does is decompose the 2024 increase and set the result against the enforcement-and-counts narrative across all three countries. That is what this paper does, using a primary Central Bank of Uzbekistan source that the literature has cited only at second hand.

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2. Background and related literature

2.1. The 2024 enforcement environment

Ibragimova (2024) reports that Russian federal and municipal authorities increased document checks, workplace raids, and border queues for Central Asian nationals from April 2024. The same source reports remittance declines for 2023 (Uzbekistan −42 percent, Kyrgyzstan −12 percent, Tajikistan −8 percent). Those figures describe the year before the enforcement intensification and are not used here as evidence of its effect. IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025, p. 12) supplies the administrative counterpart cited in Section 1, together with legislative changes effective at the start of 2025 that limit visa-free stays to 90 days per calendar year and create a register of monitored individuals. The United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 16) adds that over 76,000 Kyrgyz nationals faced Russian re-entry bans as of 1 October 2024.

The same page of the IOM report records an alternative account of the Kyrgyz decline from the authority that reported it. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs "attributed this decline to changing migration trends, noting that more Kyrgyz citizens are now seeking employment opportunities in Türkiye, the United States of America and European countries" (IOM Kyrgyzstan, 2025, p. 12). Kabar (2024) quotes the minister to the same effect. We record enforcement and the reported counts as contemporaneous, not as cause and effect.

2.2. Why recorded remittances need not track migrant counts

Frankel (2009) analyzes bilateral remittances using a large country-pair dataset. He finds the lagged stock of emigrants to be "very highly significant statistically" as a determinant of remittances, and he plots remittances "expressed relative to the lagged stock of migrants" when estimating cyclicality. He is explicit that his cyclical estimates do not separate per-migrant sending from migration flows: the design captures "not only the decision of migrants whether to send money home… but also the decision of workers whether to migrate in the first place," and he treats the combined effect as the object of interest. He describes his country pairs only as mostly in Europe and Asia and does not list them, so whether a Russia–Central Asia corridor is included cannot be determined from the paper.

Two implications matter here. Remittances and migrant counts are distinct quantities and need not move together, so their divergence is not by itself anomalous. And any claim about per-migrant sending presupposes a migrant-stock measure stable across the compared periods; Frankel obtains one by using a census-based stock at a fixed earlier date, and Section 4.6 shows that no comparable series exists for these corridors in 2023–2024.

2.3. The 2023 regional decline and its proposed explanations

World Bank (2024) documents a 10.3 percent decline in remittances to Europe and Central Asia in 2023, driven by reduced transfers from Russia. The brief reports that average US-dollar monthly wages **in** Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan were only 41.9, 38.8, and 19.6 percent of Russian levels, and offers this origin-country wage gap as a reason migration to Russia continued. The statistic compares domestic wages in the three countries with Russian levels; it is not a measure of what migrants earn inside Russia, and we do not use it as one.

The brief proposes two mechanisms for the 2023 decline that concern measurement rather than behavior. Som appreciation against the ruble "could have diverted remittances to informal channels," and Central Asian nationals acquiring Russian citizenship are reclassified from nonresident to resident so that their transfers "are no longer recorded as cross-border remittance activities by nonresident migrants." Both concern a year of opposite sign, and both describe movements across the boundary of what official statistics record. We hold no 2024 measurement of flows outside that boundary, so we cite them as reasons why

recorded totals and population counts can diverge, not as candidate explanations of the 2024 increase in either direction.

2.4. Three concepts that must be kept apart

The sources use three ideas that are easy to conflate, and the argument depends on separating them.

The **recorded perimeter** is the set of transfers that appear in a country's cross-border statistics. It is defined by residency status and reporting obligations, not by whether a transfer is legal or visible.

A **transfer channel** is the instrument used inside that perimeter: a money-transfer operator, a card-to-card peer-to-peer transaction, or a SWIFT payment. Composition can shift among channels with no change in the perimeter.

The **registered migrant stock** is an administrative count produced by an immigration or labor authority under its own registration rules. It measures compliance with those rules as much as presence.

A shift among transfer channels is therefore not evidence about the perimeter, and a change in a registration count is not evidence about the number of people present or remitting. Section 4.2 reports channel composition without drawing perimeter inferences; Section 4.6 reports registration counts without converting them into population change.

3. Data and method

3.1. Sources and eligibility

Headline figures come from sources opened and verified against a 2026-05-01 evidence cutoff under a documented protocol. A figure is citable in the main analysis when the reported value is directly verified in the primary or clearly attributed secondary document, and when an independent, cutoff-consistent basis exists for that document's publication date. Real-time downloads of dynamic institutional web tables whose only pre-cutoff evidence is their own file-modification timestamp are treated as circumstantial and used only as cross-checks. One live spreadsheet, the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic's cross-border remittance table, carried a modification timestamp after the cutoff and was excluded from primary use; state-media reporting of the same institution's figures, with an independent publication date, is used instead. The eligibility ledger, including every excluded or downgraded figure and its reason, is preserved in 02-evidence-ledger-v03.csv, evidence-validation-v02/source-ledger.csv, and evidence-validation-v02/results-diagnostic.csv.

Three applications of the protocol carry the new material. First, we recovered the primary Central Bank of Uzbekistan document that Gazeta.uz (2025) links from the word "said" in its opening sentence: a four-page review of individuals' foreign-exchange operations (CBU, 2025a). Three mutually independent bases date it before the cutoff. Its embedded document metadata gives a creation and modification timestamp of 2025-01-17, repeated in its XMP packet. The exact document URL has five Internet Archive captures between 2025-01-20 and 2025-05-31, all carrying one content digest identical to the copy we hold, and the archived origin-server header for those captures gives a last-modified date of 2025-01-20. And the file is linked from an independently dated publication of 2025-01-24. Retrieval occurred on 2026-09-21, which is a retrieval date and not a publication date; the ledger records the two separately, and the archive record is in evidence-validation-v03/sources/_cbu_archive_check.json. Second, Uzbekistan's inflow from Russia (USD 11.5 billion, +29 percent) is stated in both CBU (2025a) and Gazeta.uz (2025) and transcribed by IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 13), so it is eligible. Third, two figures appearing only in the Central Bank's *Annual Report 2024* (CBU, 2025b), namely personal transfers received by households at USD 11.6 billion and primary income receipts at USD 5.7 billion, remain circumstantial: that is a different, 195-page document with different document metadata, its only pre-cutoff dating evidence is its

own creation timestamp, the live page listing it shows a post-cutoff update, and a repeated archive check returned no capture of its URL.

3.2. Definitions, denominators, and comparability

The three countries do not report remittances on one basis, and we do not force them onto one. Tajikistan's headline figures are the World Bank's US-dollar-denominated balance-of-payments aggregate and its remittances-to-GDP ratio; the dollar denomination matters because the exchange-rate scenarios in Section 4.5 apply only to a dollar-denominated series. Uzbekistan reports a single total-inflows series, which World Bank (2024) puts at USD 13.9 billion for 2023 on its own aggregate definition against the USD 11.4 billion cross-border transfer series used here; we report the difference rather than reconcile it. Kyrgyzstan reports gross and net inflow separately, and we never merge them into a range.

Where a source reports a 2024 level with no independently stated 2023 base, we report the level and compute no year-on-year change. Where a figure is reconstructed from other stated figures, we say so and use it only to test internal consistency, never as a reported value. Rounding intervals are computed before any reconstructed figure is relied upon, and derived shares carry the interval admitted by their inputs rather than a single exact figure. Interval endpoints are rounded outward to one decimal, so a printed interval never understates the computed one.

Migrant-stock figures receive separate treatment. Every such figure here is a secondary transcription of a statement by a national authority or an international body, and no source in the reviewed corpus states the population definition, registration rule, or coverage of the underlying count. We report each as a dated, attributed statement and do not combine statements from different authorities into a series.

3.3. Exchange-rate scenarios

We computed the annual arithmetic mean of the Bank of Russia's official daily RUB/USD fixing across all trading days in 2023 (n = 247) and 2024 (n = 248) from the central bank's published daily series (Bank of Russia, 2025). Point-in-time fixings for closed past dates are not subject to later revision, unlike balance-of-payments or GDP aggregates, and are therefore treated as eligible under the same cutoff standard even though the series was accessed as a live download. Throughout we state which direction a percentage refers to, because RUB-per-USD and the ruble's own dollar value change by different amounts.

We report exchange-rate results as clearly labelled **scenarios**, not as bounds on actual remittance growth, and none of them is a central finding. Four properties of these data rule out any bounding interpretation. Monthly-mean extrema constrain a stipulated monthly-conversion model and say nothing about the daily or intraday rates at which transfers actually convert. Country of origin is not currency of denomination, so assuming that Russia-sourced inflows are ruble-denominated is a stipulation rather than a conservative treatment of a mixed-currency total. Gross-inflow weights cannot be applied to a net growth rate without an outflow model that no source supports. And holding ruble amounts constant produces a nominal counterfactual, not inflation-adjusted real growth. Each scenario below therefore states its stipulations, and Section 4.5 reports what the scenarios fail to exclude as well as what they do.

3.4. What the migrant-stock statements can and cannot support

Section 4.6 tabulates every pre-cutoff official or officially relayed statement about Central Asian nationals in Russia that we located. These statements differ in reference date, in reporting authority, and in the words used for the counted population, and one of them reports a change rather than a level. We therefore treat them as non-comparable measurement scenarios: we report the levels as stated, and we derive nothing from them. In particular, we compute no rate of change between any two of them, we do not substitute them into a per-migrant identity, we do not convert a stated percentage change into a level by supplying a base from another statement, and we do not use any such quantity as a result

or as robustness evidence. Section 4.6 states why: statements about different populations at different dates cannot serve as the numerator and denominator of a single ratio, and any spread so produced would measure the incomparability of the inputs rather than any property of remittance behaviour.

3.5. Recomputation and code

Every calculation is set out step by step, with inputs and locators, in 05-recomputation-v04.md, which also records the commands run and their output. Three scripts reproduce the results: analysis/channel_decomposition_v04.py for Sections 4.2 and 4.4, analysis/fx_scenarios_v03.py for Section 4.5, and analysis/make_figures_v04.py for both figures in both languages. The pre-existing consistency check analysis/verify_results.py is unchanged and was re-run; it reproduces the 47 percent versus 50.0 percent gap discussed in Section 4.7.

4. Results

4.1. Recorded remittances rose in all three countries

Table 1 reports the eligible figures. Tajikistan's World Bank aggregate grew 45.5 percent and reached about 49 percent of GDP, up from 39 percent (World Bank, 2025). Uzbekistan's total inflows rose from USD 11.4 billion to USD 14.8 billion, an increase of 29.8 percent as stated by Gazeta.uz (2025) and of 30 percent as stated by CBU (2025a), which also states the increment directly as USD 3.4 billion. Kyrgyzstan's net inflow rose 18.6 percent to USD 2.5 billion and its gross inflow 10.5 percent to USD 3.0 billion, while total outflow to all destinations fell 20.6 percent (Xinhua, 2025). IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025, p. 15) independently transcribes the same gross series at USD 2,706 million and USD 2,989 million, reproducing the growth rate from levels.

Table 1. Eligible 2024 Remittance and Exchange-Rate Figures

Country	Metric	2023	2024	Change	Source
Tajikistan	Total remittances (WB aggregate, USD BOP series)	—	—	+45.5%	World Bank (2025)
Tajikistan	Remittances / GDP	39%	49%	+10 pp	World Bank (2025)
Tajikistan	Net compensation of employees (WB proxy)	USD 3.2bn	USD 4.8bn	+47% (WB text)[a]	World Bank (2025)
Uzbekistan	Total remittance inflows	USD 11.4bn	USD 14.8bn	+29.8%[b]	Gazeta.uz (2025); CBU (2025a)
Uzbekistan	Inflows from Russia	—	USD 11.5bn	+29%[c]	CBU (2025a); Gazeta.uz (2025); IOM Uzbekistan (2025)
Kyrgyzstan	Net remittance inflow	—	USD 2.5bn	+18.6%	Xinhua (2025)
Kyrgyzstan	Gross remittance inflow	USD 2.706bn	USD 2.989bn	+10.5%	Xinhua (2025); IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025)
Kyrgyzstan	Inflows from Russia	—	USD 2.78bn (93%)	—[e]	IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025)
Kyrgyzstan	Total remittance outflow (all destinations)	—	USD 0.4458bn	−20.6%	Xinhua (2025)
Russia (context)	RUB/USD, annual mean	85.81	92.66	+7.98%[d]	Bank of Russia (2025)
Russia (context)	RUB/USD, year-end	89.69	101.68	+13.37%[d]	Bank of Russia (2025)

Note. Dashes indicate no independently stated comparable-period figure. The Kyrgyz 2023 levels for net inflow and total outflow exist only in a live National Bank spreadsheet whose file-modification timestamp postdates the cutoff, so they are held as diagnostic cross-checks rather than entered here. [a]The source states 47 percent; the printed one-decimal pair implies 50.0 percent, and the underlying national-accounts detail implies 46.8 percent (Section 4.7). [b]Three figures are stated for this one quantity: 29.8 percent (Gazeta.uz), 30 percent (CBU text), and 29.96 percent implied by CBU's own monthly series. They are mutually consistent within rounding but not identical, and we report all three rather than select one silently. [c]Stated by the source. Dividing the stated USD 11.5bn by the monthly-series total gives 77.44 percent, consistent with the stated 77 percent share; dividing by the rounded USD 14.8bn total gives 77.70 percent, which is an artifact of using a rounded denominator. [d]Change in RUB per USD. Expressed as the ruble's own dollar value, the corresponding changes are −7.39 percent and −11.79 percent. [e]No 2023 Kyrgyz level from Russia is stated, so no growth rate is entered; Section 4.3 derives the direction of the change from the stated share and the stated totals. Two figures from the Central Bank's *Annual Report 2024* (CBU, 2025b) remain circumstantial and are excluded (Section 3.1).

4.2. What changed in Uzbekistan: two margins of the increment

CBU (2025a) and Gazeta.uz (2025) decompose Uzbekistan's 2024 total in two independent ways. Each decomposition sums to the same total, and neither source publishes a cross-tabulation of the two.

CBU (2025a) carries three sets of chart data labels that no prior account has used: a monthly inflow series for both years, the 2023 and 2024 levels of each transfer channel, and the 2023 and 2024 levels of four developed source countries. The twelve 2023 monthly values sum to USD 11,427 million and the twelve 2024 values to USD 14,851 million, giving an increment of USD 3,424 million against the USD 3.4 billion the same document states in words. The three channel levels sum independently to exactly the same two totals, so two separately extracted chart series close on each other to the million. The stated one-decimal totals, 11.4 and 14.8 billion, are consistent with truncation of those sums rather than with rounding, since rounding 14,851 to one decimal would give 14.9. The three monthly values Gazeta.uz quotes (July USD 1.78 billion, August USD 1.55 billion, December USD 1.07 billion) agree with the series values 1,785, 1,555, and 1,072 to the nearest USD 10 million, which is what truncation to two decimals produces and which confirms the extraction.

On the **source-country margin**, Russia supplied USD 11.5 billion, 77 percent of the total and a 29 percent increase, while its share fell from 78.2 percent. Kazakhstan supplied USD 795 million and Türkiye USD 405 million, for which no 2023 level is stated. For four developed economies the source states both years: the United States rose from USD 427m to USD 577m, South Korea from USD 342m to USD 534m, the European Union from USD 311m to USD 410m, and the United Kingdom from USD 74m to USD 135m. The four implied growth rates reproduce the 35, 56, 32 and 83 percent the same document states in words, which is what fixes the assignment of the chart labels to the categories. Every non-Russian growth rate the sources state exceeds the growth of the total.

On the **transfer-channel margin**, traditional money-transfer systems rose from USD 7,136m to USD 8,161m (+14.4 percent as stated by Gazeta.uz, +14 percent as stated by CBU), peer-to-peer card transfers from USD 3,924m to USD 5,916m (+50.8 and +51 percent respectively, with their share of the total rising from 34 to 40 percent), and SWIFT from USD 367m to USD 774m, a multiple CBU states as 2.1 times and Gazeta.uz describes only as "more than doubled." The instrument shift also shows in transaction counts: CBU (2025a) reports about 71 million peer-to-peer transactions in 2024, 47 percent more than in 2023, against 50.8 percent growth in peer-to-peer volume.

Table 2. Uzbekistan's 2024 Remittance Total on Two Independent Margins

Margin	Component	2023	2024	Change
Source country	Russia	not stated	USD 11.5bn	+29% (stated)
Source country	Russia's share of total	78.2%	77%	−1.2 pp
Source country	Kazakhstan	not stated	USD 795m	—
Source country	United States	USD 427m	USD 577m	+35% (stated)

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Margin	Component	2023	2024	Change
Source country	South Korea	USD 342m	USD 534m	+56% (stated)
Source country	Türkiye	not stated	USD 405m	—
Source country	European Union	USD 311m	USD 410m	+32% (stated)
Source country	United Kingdom	USD 74m	USD 135m	+83% (stated)
Transfer channel	Traditional MTO systems	USD 7,136m	USD 8,161m	+14.4% (stated)
Transfer channel	Peer-to-peer card transfers	USD 3,924m	USD 5,916m	+50.8% (stated)
Transfer channel	SWIFT	USD 367m	USD 774m	×2.1 (stated)
Transfer channel	All three channels	USD 11,427m	USD 14,851m	+3,424m

Note. CBU (2025a) chart 2 (developed source countries) and chart 3 (transfer channels), with the growth rates as stated in the same document's text; Gazeta.uz (2025) carries one more decimal on two channel rates. Levels are the chart data labels in whole millions. The four developed-country levels and the three channel levels are stated by the source, not reconstructed. No source states Russia's, Kazakhstan's or Türkiye's 2023 level. The named 2024 source countries sum to USD 14,356 million, leaving USD 495 million for the "other countries" the source does not itemise. The two margins are not nested and no source gives an origin-by-channel cross-tabulation, so no channel movement may be attributed to any source country; in particular the peer-to-peer increase cannot be read as a Russia-corridor phenomenon. All three channels lie inside the recorded perimeter defined in Section 2.4, so this table carries no information about flows outside it.

Table 3 decomposes the increment. Peer-to-peer transfers account for the majority of it on every basis considered, and the result is not sensitive to which basis is used.

Table 3. Contributions to Uzbekistan's 2024 Increment, by Transfer Channel

Channel	2023 level	2024 level	Increment (USD m)	Share of the USD 3,424m increment
Traditional MTO systems	7,136	8,161	1,025	29.9%
Peer-to-peer card transfers	3,924	5,916	1,992	58.2%
SWIFT	367	774	407	11.9%
Total	11,427	14,851	3,424	100.0%

Note. The shares are point estimates. They difference the channel levels CBU (2025a) publishes: 1,025 / 3,424 = 29.9357 percent, 1,992 / 3,424 = 58.1776 percent and 407 / 3,424 = 11.8867 percent, reported at source precision as 29.9, 58.2 and 11.9. The three increments sum to 3,424 exactly, so the shares sum to 100.0 percent by construction and no residual is needed. They are reported at the precision of their inputs: the levels are published as whole millions, which admits one million either way on each increment and three million on the total. On that grid the peer-to-peer share computes to between 58.0975 and 58.2578 percent, which the outward rule of Section 3.2 prints as 58.0 to 58.3; traditional computes to 29.8804 to 29.9912 (printed 29.8 to 30.0) and SWIFT to 11.8471 to 11.9263 (printed 11.8 to 12.0). No wider interval attaches to these shares. Separately, and not as an uncertainty of them, a coarse-reporting sensitivity asks what an estimator restricted to the one-decimal totals and growth rates would give: increments of 1,027.1, 1,990.9 and 406.0 against the same denominator, hence its own point estimates of 29.9971, 58.1454 and 11.8575 percent, and, once the denominator is also bounded by the rounding of both annual totals so that the increment lies between USD 3,300m and USD 3,500m, ranges of 29.2 to 31.3, 56.7 to 60.5 and 11.3 to 12.6 percent with endpoints rounded outward. That estimator's SWIFT residual of 406.0 implies a multiple of 2.103 against the 2.109 the published levels give and the 2.1 the source states, and both figures fall inside the USD 396.4–414.0 million interval that multiple admits. Dividing the published-level increments (1,025, 1,992 and 407) by the USD 3,400m increment CBU states in words would give 30.1, 58.6 and 12.0 percent, which sum to 100.7 percent because the numerators total 3,424; we therefore use the source's own levels as the denominator and report this alternative only here. The decomposition is an accounting attribution of where the recorded increment was booked, not a causal explanation of why it occurred.

Why the preferred estimate uses CBU (2025a) rather than the press report alone. Working from Gazeta.uz only, the increment has to be taken as the difference of two one-decimal totals (14.8 − 11.4 = 3.4), the 2023 channel levels have to be reconstructed from growth rates, and SWIFT's 2023 level is bounded only by the words "more than doubled", which yield only the inequalities 2023 < USD 0.387bn and increment > USD 0.387bn and no point value. CBU (2025a) removes all three weaknesses at once: it states the

increment directly, publishes the monthly series that gives USD 3,424 million, and publishes the channel levels for both years. A reader can reproduce the preferred figure in one line, (5,916 − 3,924) / 3,424 = 58.2 percent, and the coarse-reporting sensitivity reported in Table 3's note from the rounding limits of its own inputs, 1,987.9 / 3,500 = 56.8 percent and 1,993.9 / 3,300 = 60.4 percent before outward rounding. analysis/channel_decomposition_v04.py prints all of these; analysis/cbu_channel_levels_v03.csv carries the channel levels and analysis/uz_monthly_inflows_v03.csv the monthly series.

Two conclusions follow, and two do not. No recorded channel contracted, so the increase is not reallocation within the recorded perimeter; and the increment was booked disproportionately through the newest instrument, shifting the channel mix by six percentage points in a single year. What does not follow is any statement about informal or unrecorded transfers, because a decomposition of recorded flows measures only recorded flows. Nor does it follow that the peer-to-peer growth came from the Russia corridor: the two margins are reported separately and no cross-tabulation exists.

4.3. What changed in Kyrgyzstan: source-country composition

No source in the reviewed corpus carries an instrument split for Kyrgyzstan, but IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025, p. 15) states a source-country share series directly: Russia supplied 98 percent of recorded inflows in 2020, 95 percent in 2022, and 93 percent in 2024, which the report reads as a trend that "may reflect a gradual shift in migration patterns and slow diversification of migration destinations for Kyrgyz citizens." The same page gives the 2024 composition in levels: Russia USD 2.78 billion, the United States USD 62.5 million, other non-CIS countries USD 59.2 million, South Korea USD 45.6 million, and Türkiye USD 17.2 million. A separate chart in World Bank (2024, Figure A.2.3) labels the Kyrgyz share as 98 percent for 2021 and 94 percent for 2023, which is compatible with the IOM series but dated differently and read from a chart rather than stated in text; we use only the series IOM states in words, and note the discrepancy rather than reconcile it.

Russia's absolute contribution rose, and the arithmetic is one line. The stated 93 percent share of the stated USD 2,989 million gross inflow is USD 2,780 million, matching the USD 2.78 billion the same page states. Even if Russia had supplied the whole of the USD 2,706 million gross inflow of 2023, the 2024 level would still be higher, so the Russia level rose by at least 2.7 percent. The United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 13) states the same direction from a different basis, reporting that remittance inflows from Russia increased by 17 percent by October 2024.

The direction matches Uzbekistan's. In both countries Russia's share of recorded inflows fell while its absolute contribution rose. The two countries' share figures are not on the same basis, since Kyrgyzstan's series is longer and Uzbekistan's is a two-point comparison, so we read the agreement as directional rather than as a common rate. Beyond direction the two cases are not symmetric. For Uzbekistan the sources state four non-Russian growth rates that all exceed the growth of the total, so faster growth outside the Russian corridor is directly evidenced. For Kyrgyzstan no 2023 level is stated for either the Russian or the non-Russian leg, so no 2023-to-2024 rate can be computed for either; what the evidence supports is the weaker statement that Russia's share declined across 2020, 2022 and 2024, which entails that non-Russian sources grew faster than Russian ones over that span taken as a whole. Figure 1, panel B, plots the two share series.

4.4. Tajikistan: what the evidence does and does not reach

No source in the reviewed pre-cutoff corpus carries an instrument split or a source-country split for Tajikistan for 2024. We searched the eligible corpus listed in Section 3.1 and the literature in Section 2; absence there is not evidence that no such publication exists. For Tajikistan the eligible evidence therefore reaches the level change and its GDP ratio, and no further: remittances grew 45.5 percent and rose from 39 to 49 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2025), and World Bank (2025, p. 7) attributes the surge to "strong




Figure 1. three panels. Panel A shows 2024 remittance growth for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan net and gross inflows, all positive. Panel B shows Russia's share of recorded inflows as a multiyear trend for Kyrgyzstan, 98 percent in 2020, 95 percent in 2022 and 93 percent in 2024, and as a two-point comparison for Uzbekistan, 78.2 percent in 2023 and 77 percent in 2024, with a note that no reviewed source carries a source-country split for Tajikistan. Panel C shows Uzbekistan's 2024 increment split between traditional money-transfer systems at 29.9 percent, peer-to-peer card transfers at 58.2 percent and SWIFT at 11.9 percent, each bar carrying its point share and no interval plotted.

Note. Panel C is an accounting decomposition of where the recorded increment was booked, not a causal explanation. Each bar carries its point share at the precision of the published whole-million levels it differences, and no interval is plotted: the wider range in Table 3's note belongs to a separate coarse-reporting sensitivity with its own point estimates, not to these shares. Because no origin-by-channel cross-tabulation is published, no part of panel C may be attributed to the Russia corridor shown in panel B, and nothing in the figure measures flows outside the recorded perimeter. Panel B's vertical axis is truncated at 70 percent and its dashed segments span years for which no observation is stated; its two series are joined because each is one authority reporting one definition, whereas the statements in Figure 2 come from different authorities and are therefore not joined. Panel B's two series are not on a common basis: Kyrgyzstan's is a multiyear trend across three stated observation years and Uzbekistan's is a two-point 2023-to-2024 comparison. They are read as directional only and no common rate is computed. Data and reproduction: analysis/uz_monthly_inflows_v03.csv, analysis/cbu_channel_levels_v03.csv, analysis/channel_decomposition_v04.py, analysis/make_figures_v04.py; panels A and B are plotted from values stated in the sources and listed in Table 1 and in this section; arithmetic in 05-recomputation-v04.md, Sections 3 and 4.

economic activity and real wage growth in Russia." That attribution is the source's, is not a measured magnitude, and is not placed by the source against stock or enforcement data.

Tajikistan is not a gap in the comparison; it is what makes the comparison informative. The three countries experienced the same enforcement shock and the same direction of remittance change, and they differ in how much of their statistics the reviewed sources carry. Where the reviewed sources disclose most, the recorded increase turns out to have a measurable compositional structure. Where they disclose least, that structure is unobservable in this corpus rather than shown to be absent. This bears directly on how the 2024 divergence should be read: the accounts that explain it by wage gains among remaining migrants are, for two of the three countries, explaining a quantity whose composition the same sources show to have shifted in a different dimension entirely.

Table 4. What Each Country's Pre-Cutoff Evidence Establishes

	Tajikistan	**Uzbekistan**	**Kyrgyzstan**
Recorded 2024 change	+45.5%; 39→49% of GDP	+29.8% (USD 11.4bn→14.8bn)	net +18.6%; gross +10.5%
Source-country composition	not in reviewed corpus	Russia 78.2→77% (2023 to 2024); non-Russian sources growing faster	Russia 98% (2020) → 95% (2022) → 93% (2024), a multiyear trend; Russia's level rose by at least 2.7%

(continued)

Table 4 (continued)

	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan
Transfer-channel composition	not in reviewed corpus	P2P 58.2% of the increment; no channel contracted	not in reviewed corpus
Intra-year profile	none in reviewed corpus	monthly, both years	quarterly, 2024 only
Migrant-count leg	two figures ~1.3m (2023) and 1,231,500 (Aug 2024), different bases	three 2024 figures spanning 2.57×	three 2023 figures spanning 2.28×; three 2024 figures spanning 1.14×
Compositional answer available?	no	yes, on both margins	yes, on the source-country margin

4.5. Exchange-rate scenarios

If migrants were paid in rubles and remitted at the prevailing rate, ruble depreciation would mechanically lower dollar-denominated remittances, holding ruble-denominated sending constant. The ruble's own dollar value fell 7.39 percent on an annual-average basis in 2024 and 11.79 percent on a year-end basis, while dollar receipts rose in all four series. Table 5 sets out three scenarios and what each does and does not settle.

Table 5. Exchange-Rate Scenarios

Scenario	Stipulations	Scope	Conversion effect	What it settles
A. Constant ruble at annual mean	all inflows ruble-denominated; ruble amounts unchanged; conversion at each year's mean daily fixing	all three countries	−7.39%	rejects a fixed-composition annual-average conversion story
B. Observed monthly weights	as A, with each year's actual monthly flow weights	Uzbekistan only	−6.50%	observed intra-year timing does not reverse Scenario A
C. Adversarial daily extremes	all 2023 flows at the year's highest daily fixing, all 2024 flows at the year's lowest	illustrative counter-scenario	+22.67%	does **not** exclude timing for either Kyrgyz series

Note. These are scenarios under stated stipulations, not bounds on actual remittance growth. All three stipulate full ruble denomination, which no source establishes: Russia supplies 77 percent of Uzbek and 93 percent of Kyrgyz inflows, and country of origin does not determine currency of denomination. All three use monthly or annual mean rates rather than the daily or intraday rates at which transfers convert. All three hold ruble amounts constant, which is a nominal counterfactual and not inflation-adjusted real growth, and that stipulation also excludes by construction a mechanism a cited source proposes: the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 13) argues that "the depreciation of the Ruble incentivized migrants to remit more funds to mitigate exchange rate losses," which is an active behavioural response in ruble amounts and therefore lies outside every scenario here. Scenario B is available only for Uzbekistan because CBU (2025a) is the only source in the reviewed corpus carrying a monthly series for both years; Kyrgyzstan's quarterly figures exist for 2024 only, and gross-inflow weights cannot be applied to the net series without an outflow model that no source supports.

Scenario C is the informative negative result. Under it the conversion effect reaches +22.67 percent, which exceeds Kyrgyzstan's gross growth of 10.5 percent and its net growth of 18.6 percent. That configuration is physically implausible, but the data do not rule it out, so no universal statement excluding transfer timing is available from these sources. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan itself lists, among the influences on inflows, seasonal factors and exchange-rate fluctuations in "the traditional countries where labour migrants work" (CBU, 2025a; rendered by Gazeta.uz, 2025, as "key migrant destinations"), and we do not claim to have separated them.

4.6. Migrant-stock statements do not reconcile

Table 6 lists every pre-cutoff official or officially relayed statement we located about Central Asian nationals in Russia. Figure 2 plots the reported levels.

For Kyrgyz nationals, Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs data relayed by the foreign minister give 650,000 registered in 2023 and 350,000 officially recorded at the end of 2024 (Kabar, 2024); IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025) reproduces this comparison twice, attributing it to the Russian ministry on page 5 and to the Kyrgyz foreign minister on page 12. The same report states on page 11 that 379,949 Kyrgyz citizens were registered in the Russian Federation at the end of 2024 and that about 600,000 Kyrgyz citizens were abroad. In November 2024 a deputy labor minister reported about 334,000 Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia, about 65,000 fewer than a year earlier (Kaktus Media, 2024), a level the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 15) independently records as ”over 334,000.” The same document states, on pages 11 and 13, that Kyrgyz migrant numbers in Russia fell 40 percent by October 2024. World Bank (2024), citing IOM, reports that 285,433 of 328,458 Kyrgyz nationals living abroad resided in Russia as of 2023.

The three figures dated 2023 span a factor of 2.28. The 40 percent decline sits with none of them: it states no base, and applying it to any of the stated levels produces a further, different base, which is why we record it and derive nothing from it. The spread is not uniform across years, since the three figures dated 2024 span only 1.14; within 2023 it is nonetheless wide enough to defeat any comparison. The two end-2024 figures differ by 8.6 percent, and only one is arithmetically consistent with the reported total abroad: 379,949 plus the other destinations on the same page sums to 563,949, close to the stated 600,000, while 350,000 is not on that footing. For Uzbek nationals, the Migration Agency’s 1,200,000 at the start of 2024 and 698,000 at the end sit alongside a September 2024 Russian ministry statement that IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 9) reports as ”nearly 1.8 million” and IOM Tajikistan (2025, p. 9) gives exactly as 1,792,600; IOM Uzbekistan notes that this figure ”is, however, significantly higher than the 698,000 Uzbek migrant workers estimated by MA Uzbekistan”. The three 2024-dated figures span 2.57. World Bank (2024) adds 630,000 registered Uzbeks working in Russia in the first quarter of 2023 and notes that ”some estimates suggest the real number could be closer to 4–8 million.” For Tajik nationals, World Bank (2024) reports ”about 1.3 million Tajik nationals lived in Russia in 2023” from unspecified official figures that it calls a likely underestimate, and IOM Tajikistan (2025, p. 9) transcribes 1,231,500 for August 2024; read together these would imply little change rather than a decline, but they are not on the same basis and we compute no rate from them. Framing all of this, World Bank (2024) reports a Russian Interior Ministry estimate of about 10.5 million migrants from the three countries working in Russia, immediately adding that this ”may be a major undercount”; that estimate is roughly 4.6 times the approximately 2.3 million in the country figures used in press accounts.

Table 6. Pre-Cutoff Official and Officially Relayed Migrant-Stock Statements

ID	Country	Date	Figure	Wording used by the source	Reporting authority and relay
S1	Kyrgyzstan	2023	650,000	registered	Russian MIA via Kyrgyz MFA (Kabar, 2024; IOM Kyrgyzstan, 2025, pp. 5, 12)
S6	Kyrgyzstan	2023	285,433	resided in Russia	IOM 2024 via World Bank (2024)
S5	Kyrgyzstan	2023, Nov window	~399,000	implied by S4 and a stated fall of about 65,000	Kyrgyz MLSPM via Kaktus Media (2024)
S4	Kyrgyzstan	Nov 2024	~334,000	labour migrants in the Russian Federation	Kyrgyz MLSPM (Kaktus Media, 2024; United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2024, p. 15)

(continued)

Table 6 (continued)

ID	Country	Date	Figure	Wording used by the source	Reporting authority and relay
S7	Kyrgyzstan	By Oct 2024	−40% (change, not a level)	40% decline in Kyrgyz migrant numbers in Russia	UN country team; no originating authority named (United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2024, pp. 11, 13)
S2	Kyrgyzstan	End 2024	350,000	officially recorded	Russian MIA via Kyrgyz MFA
S3	Kyrgyzstan	End 2024	379,949	registered in the Russian Federation	Kyrgyz MLSPM via IOM Kyrgyzstan (2025, p. 11)
S11	Uzbekistan	2023 Q1	630,000	registered Uzbeks working in Russia as migrant laborers	unspecified official via World Bank (2024)
S8	Uzbekistan	Start 2024	1,200,000	living in the Russian Federation	Uzbek Migration Agency via IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 9)
S10	Uzbekistan	Sep 2024	1,792,600	Uzbek nationals residing in the country	Russian MIA via IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 9, as ”nearly 1.8 million”); exact figure via IOM Tajikistan (2025, p. 9)
S9	Uzbekistan	End 2024	698,000	Uzbek migrant workers estimated by MA Uzbekistan	Uzbek Migration Agency via IOM Uzbekistan (2025, p. 9)
S12	Tajikistan	2023	~1,300,000	Tajik nationals lived in Russia, official figures	unspecified official via World Bank (2024)
S13	Tajikistan	Aug 2024	1,231,500	Tajik migrants residing in the Russian Federation	Russian MIA via IOM Tajikistan (2025, p. 9)

Note. The wording column reproduces each source’s own words in the language in which that source publishes, because the exact wording is what the column exists to record; all of these sources publish in English. Every entry is a secondary transcription; no originating statistical release was opened, and no source in the reviewed corpus states the registration rule, coverage, or population definition behind its figure. S7 is the one entry expressed as a change rather than a level; it has no stated base, so it cannot be placed on the levels axis of Figure 2 and no base is inferred for it. The entries are not a series. We compute no rate of change between any two of them and derive no per-migrant quantity from them, because statements about different populations at different dates cannot serve as the numerator and denominator of a single ratio, and any spread so produced would measure the incomparability of the inputs rather than any property of remittance behavior.

4.7. A vintage difference and a rounding gap in the Tajikistan sources

Two internal discrepancies in the Tajikistan evidence require disclosure.

The first is a vintage difference. IOM Tajikistan (2025, p. 11) reports that Tajikistan received USD 5.8 billion in remittances in 2024, a 27 percent increase over 2023 (USD 4.6 billion), and that remittances were 45 percent of GDP, citing a World Bank blog post of 18 December 2024 (Ratha et al., 2024). World Bank (2025) gives +45.5 percent and about 49 percent of GDP. The 2023 base of USD 4.6 billion is independently confirmed in World Bank (2024), so the two chains agree on the base and differ only on 2024. The December 2024 figures are an estimate published during the reference year; the July 2025 figures are actuals. We use the later vintage, report the earlier one here, and do not merge them into a range. IOM Tajikistan’s own executive summary states USD 5.9 billion against USD 5.8 billion in its body text, a further internal inconsistency we record without resolving.

The second is a rounding gap. The World Bank’s footnote states that Tajikistan’s compensation-of-employees proxy ”grew by 47 percent—or from US$3.2 billion in 2023 to US$4.8 billion in 2024” (World Bank, 2025). The ratio 4.8 / 3.2 is 1.5, a growth rate of 50.0 percent, and re-running analysis/verify_results.py reproduces that gap. Values consistent with one-decimal rounding admit any rate from 46.15 to




Figure 2. a horizontal dot plot with one row per statement on a logarithmic scale. Six Kyrgyz statements range from 285,433 to 650,000, four Uzbek statements from 630,000 to 1,792,600, and two Tajik statements from 1,231,500 to about 1,300,000. Annotations record that Kyrgyz figures dated 2023 span a factor of 2.28, Kyrgyz figures dated 2024 span only 1.14, and Uzbek figures dated 2024 span 2.57.

Note. Each point is one dated, attributed statement, plotted at its reported level. Points are deliberately not joined and no rate of change, trend, or per-migrant quantity is derived from them, because the statements come from different authorities and describe different populations at different dates using five different descriptions, and no source in the reviewed corpus states a registration rule, coverage, or population definition for any of them. S7 is a change and not a level and so does not appear in the plot; it is in Table 6. Colour denotes country of origin; each row names the reporting authority and carries the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 country code. Full wording and relay chains are in Table 6. Data and reproduction: analysis/stock_statements_v03.csv, analysis/make_figures_v04.py.

53.97 percent, so 47 percent is attainable, but it requires the 2023 value high in its interval and the 2024 value low in its interval. A cleaner reading comes from the national-accounts detail, where the underlying levels of USD 3,258.49 million and USD 4,783.09 million give 46.79 percent, which rounds to the stated 47 percent while the printed pair does not. That detail carries only circumstantial cutoff evidence, so we offer it as an explanation rather than as independent proof. We quote the source's 47 percent for that line item and rely on the separately stated total-remittances growth of 45.5 percent for the headline.

5. Discussion

The question was whether the 2024 coexistence of tighter enforcement, reported falls in registered migrant counts, and rising dollar remittances is an artifact or a real change in how and from where remittances flow. Across the three countries the evidence answers it in three graded steps.

The recorded growth is consistently reported by independently dated pre-cutoff sources in all three countries. Every headline figure is stated directly by such a source, the Kyrgyz gross series is reproducible from levels transcribed independently by IOM, and the Uzbek total reconciles to a monthly series and a channel series published by the central bank itself, which close on each other to the million. Conversion does not account for the growth under a constant-ruble annual scenario, and for Uzbekistan the observed two-year monthly weighting does not reverse that. The exclusion is conditional: an adversarial daily-extremes scenario is not excluded for either Kyrgyz series, so we cannot say that timing has been ruled

out generally. What survives is that the simplest conversion story fails and that the more detailed scenario available for the largest recipient does not rescue it. What we can say is about the recorded perimeter defined in Section 2.4, not about total sending.

The compositional change is real where it can be measured, and it is not the change the reported pairing asserts. In Uzbekistan the 2024 increment was booked 58.2 percent through peer-to-peer card transfers, 29.9 percent through traditional money-transfer systems, and 11.9 percent through SWIFT, with no recorded channel contracting and the peer-to-peer share of the stock of flows rising from 34 to 40 percent in one year. In both countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split, Russia's share fell while its absolute contribution rose; for Uzbekistan the sources also state four non-Russian growth rates that all exceed the growth of the total, while for Kyrgyzstan the falling multiyear share is what the evidence supports and no 2023-to-2024 rate is available for either leg. These are changes in the instruments people use and in the geography of the flows, documented in the sources rather than inferred. They are also, on their face, hard to reconcile with an account in which the whole of the 2024 increase is wage gains accruing to a shrinking population inside Russia, though we do not claim to have tested that account: an accounting decomposition of where an increment was booked is not a causal explanation of why it arose.

The third step is the one that cannot be taken. The migrant-count leg of the reported pairing is not measurable with the available statistics. Official and officially relayed figures for Kyrgyz nationals dated 2023 span a factor of 2.28 and those for Uzbek nationals dated 2024 span 2.57; the same country-year carries five different descriptions of the counted population; no source in the reviewed corpus publishes a registration rule or coverage statement; and the Russian ministry's own regional aggregate is roughly 4.6 times the country figures used in press accounts. Neither operation the reported pairing needs is available on this evidence: singling out one statement would overstate it against the several that conflict with it, and dividing across two of them would compute a ratio from a numerator and a denominator describing different populations at different dates, which measures the incomparability of the inputs and nothing else.

The case comparison holds together because disclosure, not exposure, is what varies. All three countries are heavily dependent on Russia-sourced transfers, all three faced the same 2024 enforcement intensification, and all three recorded double-digit dollar growth. What differs is how much of their statistics the reviewed sources carry, and the comparison shows that this difference is consequential: on the source-country margin the two countries whose reviewed sources carry the split agree in direction, which is evidence that the diversification is regional rather than an Uzbek peculiarity; on the instrument margin only Uzbekistan's sources carry a channel split, so the P2P result stands as a single well-documented case rather than a regional finding, and we label it that way. For Tajikistan the reviewed corpus carries neither split, which marks the boundary of what this evidence permits anyone to say. That boundary is a property of the corpus we assembled, not a demonstrated property of the national statistical systems: we did not audit what these authorities publish, and a figure absent here may exist in a release we did not locate.

Two candidate explanations require different treatment. The wage channel is not this paper's inference, but two eligible sources make the attribution and are recorded as such: World Bank (2025, p. 7) on "strong economic activity and real wage growth in Russia," and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan on rising economic activity, labour demand and wages in migrant-receiving countries together with a rising share of high-income countries in the composition of migration geography (CBU, 2025a; relayed by Gazeta.uz, 2025, as a growing share of transfers from high-income nations). These are institutional attributions, not measured magnitudes, and we obtained no primary Russian wage data. The channel-formalization explanation is not available on this evidence: all three Uzbek channels lie inside the recorded perimeter, so the split cannot measure movement across it in either direction, and retaining informal-to-recorded movement as a candidate would attribute to the data an inference they cannot carry.

Relative to the nearest accounts, the increment is as follows. Against IOM's three country reports, which transcribe stock and remittance figures without decomposing the increment or resolving the au-

thority conflict they themselves flag, this paper recovers and uses the underlying central-bank source and reports the decomposition. Against World Bank (2025), which attributes the Tajik surge without placing it against stock or channel data, it supplies the composition for the two countries where composition exists. Against World Bank (2024), which warns that registered counts may be a major undercount for 2023, it shows what that warning implies quantitatively for the 2024 figures now in circulation. Two pre-cutoff accounts come closest to the pairing itself. Kabar (2024) paired the Kyrgyz halving with rising remittances for one country and explained it by wages; the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 13) paired a 40 percent decline with a 17 percent rise in Russia-sourced inflows and proposed both a compositional and a behavioural mechanism. Against both, this paper covers three countries, checks whether the two series can be compared, and reports that they cannot. The UN account's behavioural mechanism, an active increase in ruble sending in response to depreciation, is excluded by construction from every scenario in Section 4.5 and is therefore untested here rather than rejected. Against Frankel (2009), the nearest academic reference, this paper supplies the missing precondition check: his design normalizes by a stable lagged stock, and we document that no such stock series exists for these corridors in this period.

Unresolved items remain. Whether part of the 2024 growth reflects a low 2023 base is untested, because 2021–2022 data were not examined. Currency composition across transfer routes is unreported everywhere in this corpus. Tajikistan's composition is unobservable in it. And the definitional basis of every migrant-stock figure is unpublished, which is the specific gap that would have to close before the per-migrant question could be reopened at all.

6. Limitations

The instrument-split result is a single-country result. Only Uzbekistan's sources in this corpus carry a channel decomposition, so the P2P finding documents one case and is not a regional finding; the source-country result covers two of three countries and is read as directional only.

The decomposition rests on chart data labels. The channel and source-country levels, like the monthly series, are extracted from the chart data labels of a PDF text layer rather than from a published data file, and they are printed as whole millions, so each carries up to half a million dollars of label rounding. Three independent checks constrain the extraction: the channel levels sum to the monthly-series totals exactly in both years, the four developed-country levels reproduce the four growth rates the same document states in words, and the three monthly values Gazeta.uz quotes agree to the nearest USD 10 million. The stated one-decimal totals are consistent with truncation rather than rounding of those sums, which is why the 2024 sum of 14,851 sits one million above what rounding of "14.8" would admit. The three stated growth figures for the Uzbek total (29.8 percent, 30 percent, and 29.96 percent implied by the series) remain mutually consistent within rounding but not identical, and we report all three. The published totals and growth rates are printed to one decimal, but the preferred channel shares do not use them: they difference the whole-million channel levels, and we report them at the precision those labels admit. The one-decimal estimator is reported separately, in Table 3's note, as a coarse-reporting sensitivity with its own point estimates.

The exchange-rate scenarios are scenarios. Each stipulates full ruble denomination, which no source establishes; each uses mean rather than transaction-level rates; and each is a nominal constant-ruble counterfactual rather than a real-growth calculation. Scenario B exists for Uzbekistan only, and Scenario C is not excluded for either Kyrgyz series, so this paper makes no general claim that transfer timing has been ruled out. The scenarios also exclude by construction the behavioural response the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2024, p. 13) proposes, in which depreciation induces migrants to send more in rubles; nothing here tests that mechanism.

Every migrant-stock figure is a secondary transcription. No originating release from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Uzbek Migration Agency, or the Kyrgyz labor ministry was opened, and no cited source publishes registration rules or coverage, so the conflicts in Section 4.6 are conflicts among published statements; the originating releases may define their populations in ways that would partly reconcile them. The figure of approximately 399,000 is implied by a stated level and a stated fall rather than reported directly, and no locally archived copy of the originating article was obtained, so the fall of about 65,000 is the one quantity in Table 6 that rests on a single unarchived relay; the 334,000 level it is derived from is independently recorded by a second source.

CBU (2025a) was retrieved on 2026-09-21, after the evidence cutoff. Its eligibility rests on the three pre-cutoff bases set out in Section 3.1, not on the retrieval date. The document is in Uzbek and was read through text extraction rather than professional translation, and the chart labels were also checked visually against a rendered image of the page. Two figures from the separate *Annual Report 2024* remain circumstantial because a repeated archive check returned no capture of its URL, which is degraded coverage rather than evidence about availability.

The study obtained no data on flows outside the recorded perimeter, no primary Russian wage series, no channel or source-country decomposition for Tajikistan, and no 2021–2022 baseline. The 47 versus 50.0 percent gap in the Tajikistan source was not resolved with the World Bank. Finally, the sources disagree on points this paper cannot adjudicate and which are reported rather than resolved: the attribution of the 650,000/350,000 comparison to a Russian or a Kyrgyz ministry on different pages of one report, the labelling of the Uzbek 1,200,000/698,000 pair as 2023–2024 in a figure and as within-2024 in the body text of the same report, IOM Tajikistan's USD 5.9 billion against its own USD 5.8 billion, and the Kyrgyz Russia-share observations dated 2020/2022/2024 by IOM against 2021/2023 in a World Bank (2024) chart.

7. Conclusion

Russia's 2024 migration enforcement intensified in the same year that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan recorded double-digit growth in US-dollar remittance receipts. That recorded growth is consistently reported by independently dated pre-cutoff sources. Currency conversion does not account for it under the two scenarios these data support, a constant-ruble annual-average conversion and, for Uzbekistan, the observed two-year monthly weighting. That result is conditional, not categorical: all such scenarios stipulate full ruble denomination, which no source in the reviewed corpus verifies, and an adversarial daily-extremes timing scenario remains unexcluded for both Kyrgyz series.

What changed, where change can be measured, is the composition of the flows rather than the population behind them. Uzbekistan's USD 3.424 billion increment was booked 58.2 percent through peer-to-peer card transfers, 29.9 percent through traditional money-transfer systems, and 11.9 percent through SWIFT, with no recorded channel contracting and the peer-to-peer share rising from 34 to 40 percent in a single year. In both countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split, Russia's share of recorded inflows fell while its absolute contribution rose: across 2020, 2022 and 2024 for Kyrgyzstan, where the 2024 Russian level exceeds even the whole of the 2023 gross inflow, and between 2023 and 2024 for Uzbekistan, whose inflows from the United Kingdom, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union all grew faster than its total. No source in the reviewed pre-cutoff corpus carries either split for Tajikistan, so for Tajikistan the evidence reaches the level change alone.

The migrant-count leg of the widely reported pairing does not support the weight placed on it. Official pre-cutoff figures conflict by factors of 2.28 and 2.57 within a single country-year, use five different descriptions of the counted population, include one statement of change with no stated base, and are accompanied in the reviewed corpus by no statement of registration rule, coverage, or population definition,

so no per-migrant quantity can be derived and this paper derives none. Read together, the two halves give a specific answer to the question posed: the 2024 increase is not explained by the currency-conversion scenarios this evidence supports, and it is not a demonstrated change in who remits, while it is accompanied by a documented change in the instruments through which money moves and in the geography it moves from. Establishing whether the sending population also changed requires the originating authorities to publish the definitions, registration rules, and coverage behind their counts, which is a different undertaking from collecting another year of data.

8. Author contributions

Dilorom Usmonova led the study design, evidence synthesis, quantitative analysis, and manuscript drafting. Nargiza Qodirova checked source use, measurement definitions, recomputations, and bilingual consistency, and contributed revisions.

9. Data and materials

The evidence ledger, recomputation files, figure input data, analysis scripts, and editable figure sources are retained with this article's research record.

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