Skip to main content
Academy of Public Policy and Economics
Academy of Public Policy and Economics
ISSN 3005-4818 (Online) · Quarterly · Open Access (CC BY 4.0)
Research Articles

One Pipeline, One Dominant Buyer, One Competitor: Turkmenistan's Gas Export Dependence and the Russia–China Displacement, 2019–2024

  1. 1 Academy of Public Policy and Economics

Abstract

Turkmenistan holds the world's fourth-largest natural gas reserves yet exports gas primarily through a single route—the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CACGP)—to a single dominant customer, China. Between 2019 and 2024, this structural dependence came under direct competitive pressure as Russia's Power of Siberia pipeline began delivering increasing volumes of Russian gas to the same Chinese market. Using China's Comtrade mirror data (HS 271121, gaseous natural gas), this article documents the twin trajectories of Turkmen and Russian pipeline gas exports to China over the six-year period. The analysis distinguishes measured customs data from Comtrade-estimated observations—notably the 2020 Turkmen volume (37.5 Mt), which the Comtrade API explicitly flags as estimated (`isNetWgtEstimated = true`; legacy estimation flag 6)—and draws primary conclusions only from measured observations. Turkmenistan's annual measured export volume fell from 29.9 Mt in 2019 to a trough of 7.6 Mt in 2022 before recovering to 19.0 Mt in 2024, while its unit value surged from $319 per tonne in 2019 to $1,349 in 2022 and fell back to $504 in 2024. Over the same period, Russia's volume share of China's gaseous gas imports rose from zero to 38.0%, while Turkmenistan's volume share fell from 68.6% to 45.2%. By late 2024, Russia was approaching parity with Turkmenistan in monthly delivery volumes. This article argues that Turkmenistan's one-buyer, one-pipeline configuration leaves it structurally vulnerable to both price swings transmitted through China's contractual pricing formulas and volumetric displacement by a politically motivated Russian competitor. Russia's brief resumption of Turkmen gas purchases in 2019—before Power of Siberia's ramp-up transformed it into a direct competitor—illustrates the asymmetry of the relationship. Without liquefied natural gas (LNG) export capacity or an alternative pipeline route, Turkmenistan possesses negligible negotiating leverage in its dominant commercial relationship.

References 10 references
  1. BP. (2024). Statistical Review of World Energy 2024. London.
  2. China National Petroleum Corporation. (2014). Response to Investor Query: Progress of the Development of Line C of the Gas Pipeline in Central Asia. https://www.cnpc.com.cn/cnpcstockinfo/dmxx/dmxx_ list_mores.jsp?language=en&pageNo=49
  3. Henderson, J., & Mitrova, T. (2015). The Political and Commercial Dynamics of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy (NG 102). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Oxford. https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784670191
  4. International Monetary Fund. (2023). Turkmenistan: 2023 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report (IMF Country Report No. 23/392). Washington, DC.
  5. Medinaceli, M. (2022). Natural Gas in Bolivia: From Boom to Decline (IDB-TN-2478). Inter-American Development Bank. Washington, DC.
  6. Pirani, S. (2019). Central Asian Gas: Prospects for the 2020s (NG 155). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Oxford. https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784671556
  7. Roberts, J. (2020). The Southern Gas Corridor and the Caspian Basin. Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. Washington, DC.
  8. Stern, J. P. (2005). The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom.
  9. United Nations. (2025). UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/
  10. Yafimava, K. (2023). Russia’s Gas Pivot to Asia: Progress, Prospects, and Constraints (NG 183). Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Oxford.