Volume 12 (2026)
Research Articles
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Environmental Code Reform, Enterprise Abatement Outlays, and Stationary Industrial Emissions: Subnational Evidence from Kazakhstan, 2010–2025
Staggered industrial environmental codes pair multi-year preparatory monitoring windows with scheduled transitions toward best-available-technique permitting and progressive fee multipliers, raising an open mechanism question: do historically emission-intensive industrial regions adjust during early preparatory compliance through enterprise current abatement outlays and end-of-pipe pollutant capture, or does emission-intensity compression emerge as integrated-permit and fee-escalation thresholds arrive? Assembling a boundary-harmonized panel across all 16 consolidated parent regions of Kazakhstan from 2010 to 2025 (N = 256) around Environmental Code No. 400-VI (enacted January 2021, entering into general force July 2021, with Category I integrated permitting and scheduled fee multipliers commencing January 2025), we estimate exposure-gradient regressions with 9,999 null-imposed wild cluster bootstrap replications. Across 2022–2025, one standard deviation higher predetermined 2017–2019 stationary emission exposure is associated with no statistically resolved change in log real enterprise current environmental protection outlays (+0.0947 log points; clustered SE = 0.0869; bootstrap p = 0.3303) and statistically unresolved shifts in stationary pollutant capture shares (-0.0167; 95% bootstrap set [-0.0773, 0.0293]; p = 0.4876) and log captured tonnage (-0.0284; p = 0.8925). Conversely, relative compression in stationary emission intensity concentrates in the 2025 commencement year (-32.85 tonnes per billion 2020 tenge of real industrial output; SE = 13.37; bootstrap p = 0.0080; inverted 95% bootstrap set [-70.60, -8.91]; six-outcome within-phase Holm p = 0.0480; 24-test Holm p = 0.1920). This 2025 gradient strengthens without contemporaneous output controls (-56.79; bootstrap p = 0.0007) and persists across parent-clustered 17-region panels (-30.47; p = 0.0014), 2014–2016 anchors (-34.35; p = 0.0064), and directionally across all 16 single-region deletions (15 significant at 5%; Pavlodar omission p = 0.0660), while coexisting with pre-2020 downward exposure drift that bounds interpretation to conditional subnational convergence.
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Paper Firms and Formal Payrolls: Registry Unification, Digital Tax-Risk Enforcement, and the Inactive-Enterprise Wedge Across Uzbekistan's Districts and Sectors
When transition states synchronize corporate registries with automated value-added tax risk scoring, does a steep contraction in active enterprise counts reflect proportional formal-payroll contraction or a two-stage administrative purge of dormant registrations? Combining harmonized district-year panels across 147 boundary-consistent parent jurisdictions covering roughly 84% of national commercial entities and formal payrolls (2016–2025, N = 1,470; payroll window 2017–2024, N = 1,176) with population-matched monthly panels across all 14 regions and nine commercial sectors of Uzbekistan (January 2022–September 2026, N = 7,182), we trace the inactive-enterprise wedge across inter-agency database unification, the January 2023 value-added tax rate cut, and compulsory deregistration. Nationally, commercial inactivity rose from 5.83% at year-end 2022 to 44.86% at year-end 2024 as operating entities fell by 31.38% alongside descriptive national growth in formal workbook employment (+2.95%) and real monthly wages (+14.01%), before receding to 32.06% at year-end 2025 during concentrated register removals. Under region-by-sector and region-by-month fixed effects with exact 14-region wild cluster bootstrap inference, invoice-chain-intensive sectors (industry, construction, and trade) exhibit a 5.56-percentage-point wider inactivity differential during the late-reclassification and deregistration phase (bootstrap p = 0.00012; 95% bootstrap confidence set [4.87, 6.26]), whereas saturating sector-by-month shocks leaves predetermined 2022Q1 regional-sector inactivity and specialization gradients statistically unresolved. Across districts, a 10-percentage-point higher 2019 trade-and-construction share yields conditional 2024 differences of -0.0160 log points in formal employment (bootstrap p = 0.4161; 95% confidence set [-0.0590, 0.0227]; 14-region 80% minimum detectable effect 0.0559) and -0.0281 in real wages (bootstrap p = 0.0908; [-0.0665, 0.0044]), surviving Greater Tashkent transfer restoration and pre-2022 district drift controls.
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Bricks Over Machines: Capital Technological Composition, Reconstruction Versus Greenfield Expansion, and Regional Industrial Growth in Uzbekistan with Subnational Benchmarks from Kazakhstan
Equipment-embodied growth theory predicts that reallocating fixed-capital formation from civil structures toward machinery and plant modernization accelerates industrial output, yet high-investment transition regions routinely channel over half of capital outlays into construction-installation works. Assembling regional fixed-capital simplex panels across all 14 regions of Uzbekistan (2000–2025 for technological shares, N = 364; 2007–2025 for reproduction modes, N = 266; 2016–2025 for constant-price industrial value-added growth, N = 140) alongside boundary-harmonized regional benchmarks from Kazakhstan (2003–2026Q3), we evaluate compositional reallocation hypotheses using full-simplex two-way fixed-effects regressions and 9,999 null-imposed wild cluster bootstrap replications. Across all six primary specifications conditioning on real investment scale, real investment growth, employment growth, and residual simplex shares, shifting 10 percentage points from construction-installation works into machinery and equipment yields statistically unresolved contemporaneous (+0.74 percentage points; bootstrap p = 0.7025; 95% bootstrap interval [-1.66, 3.66]) and lagged (+0.56; bootstrap p = 0.3828) industrial growth associations that remain null under predetermined scale controls (+0.63; bootstrap p = 0.3710); a one-year-ahead dynamic association (+1.52; bootstrap p = 0.0319) does not survive six-horizon Holm correction (p = 0.1914), and omitting either Karakalpakstan's 10 region-years (-0.60; bootstrap p = 0.0812) or its single 2016 observation (-0.35; bootstrap p = 0.4017) reverses contemporaneous point estimates negative. On the capital-input margin, reallocating 10 percentage points from greenfield expansion to reconstruction and modernization is associated with a 4.35 percentage-point higher regional machinery share (bootstrap p = 0.0003; 5.75 percentage points with real-scale controls, bootstrap p = 0.0003), while Uzbek-Kazakh subnational comparisons show persistent civil-works dominance whose cross-sectional financing gradients depend on regional consolidation and own-funds scope.
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Lower spring carryover and uneven downstream delivery in the Syr Darya, 2024–2026
Recent Syr Darya water accounts show lower spring carryover alongside uneven downstream delivery. We compare three consecutive institutional water accounts for October 2024–March 2026 and interpret their outcomes alongside water–energy agreements and operating decisions. Toktogul's closing storage changed from 0.42 km³ above plan to shortfalls of 0.53 and 0.38 km³. The summer 2025 shortfall combined inflow 0.22 km³ below forecast, releases 0.26 km³ above plan, and a −0.05 km³ balance deviation. In winter 2025–2026, releases exceeded plan by 0.54 km³ despite inflow exceeding forecast by 0.17 km³; the balance deviation was −0.01 km³. Actual end-winter storage was also 1.35 km³ lower than a year earlier, reflecting lower opening storage and inflow despite reduced year-on-year releases. Downstream performance separated further: in the latter winter, Shardara inflow reached 101.89% of plan while reported Aral supply reached 43.80%. The 0.68 km³ Aral shortfall comprised 0.63 km³ less river release from Shardara and 0.05 km³ greater lower-reach net depletion. These comparisons establish two concurrent outcomes: lower spring carryover and downstream delivery below target even when intermediate inflow met plan. Seasonal cooperation therefore faces distinct storage and delivery constraints whose location and timing determine the water benefit actually realized. Keywords: Syr Darya; Toktogul; seasonal storage; downstream delivery; water–energy cooperation; Aral Sea
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Uneven gains at the China–Kazakhstan rail gateways: Border time and cost in 2023–2024
Reported improvement at the China–Kazakhstan rail gateways varied across time and cost measures. We reanalyze published mean and median durations for four country-side gateway operations in 2023 and 2024, add Kazakhstan-side border costs, and interpret the results against official accounts of rail interchange. Dostyk's mean and median inbound times fell by 13.3 and 12.5 hours. Altynkol's mean fell more, by 17.0 hours, but its median fell only 2.3 hours. In 2024, Altynkol had a 1.1-hour mean-time advantage over Dostyk alongside a 3.1-hour median-time disadvantage and higher mean and median costs by $36 and $125. Its earlier $93 mean-cost advantage had reversed. Chinese outbound performance moved differently: Horgos was faster than Alashankou by both time statistics in 2023 and slower by both in 2024. Across the adjacent pairs, Kazakhstan inbound mean times remained 2.65–3.18 times the Chinese outbound means in 2024. The reported gains thus differed across the duration distribution, cost dimension, and border side. Dostyk combined reductions across all four reported time–cost summaries, whereas Altynkol's larger mean-time reduction accompanied little median-time change and increased mean cost. These profiles support targeted attention to receiving-side interchange and cost–time trade-offs when evaluating the gateways serving Central Asian transport. Keywords: China–Kazakhstan; rail gateways; Dostyk; Altynkol; Middle Corridor; border performance
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Sovereignty Settled Once, Use Rights Carved Out by Object: How the 2025 Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan Border Package Combined Territory, Movement, Water and Resettlement
Background. On 13 March 2025 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed sixteen documents settling their last contested boundary sections, usually discussed as one treaty.
Main body. Object by object, this article asks what the package did to territorial title, road passage, shared water infrastructure and transferred settlements' residents, across 29 arrangements in six classes, on material published before 1 May 2026. Title moved once for the whole line, a net 793.0 hectares to Kyrgyzstan across six transfer entries, yet none of the fourteen territorial objects has an object-level transfer record. Two crossing points reopened on the day of signature, two air links within three days; one of three roads is under construction. A bilateral water commission met once, on 9 October 2025; neither water facility has a documented act. A domestic programme built 257 houses at three sites: 181 families were reported moved into the new Chet-Bulak village, where the same report saw empty houses, and by 29 November all Leilek families due to relocate were in the 76 Razzakov and Maksat houses. Dostuk households received 20 sotka, four times the 5-sotka quota announced there, the other five settlements 10 sotka with no quota located for them. Crop compensation at Zhany-Dostuk was unpaid.
Conclusion. Six of the 29 arrangements had a documented act of the kind their class admits, eighteen a legal act only. Separating land sovereignty from facility use is established regional practice, the third case strictly and the sixth broadly; the commission statute omits the individual water use right its closest precedent reportedly states.
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Tighter Enforcement, Larger Remittances: What Actually Changed in 2024 Flows to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan
In 2024 Russian authorities intensified checks, raids, and deportations directed at Central Asian labor migrants, while official statistics recorded double-digit growth in US-dollar remittance receipts: +45.5 percent for Tajikistan, +29.8 percent for Uzbekistan, and +18.6 percent net and +10.5 percent gross for Kyrgyzstan. Contemporary reporting paired that growth with a reported halving of the registered Kyrgyz migrant population in Russia and explained it by wage gains among those who stayed. We ask what pre-cutoff evidence establishes about that pairing for each country.
The composition of recorded flows changed, in instruments and in geography. Using primary monthly and channel data from the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, we difference the 2024 increment rather than approximate it. The channel levels the bank publishes directly show that peer-to-peer card transfers supplied 58.2 percent of the USD 3.424 billion increase, against 29.9 percent for traditional money-transfer systems and 11.9 percent for SWIFT, with no recorded channel contracting. In the two countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split, Russia's recorded share fell while its absolute contribution rose; the Kyrgyz series runs across 2020, 2022 and 2024, the Uzbek comparison across 2023 and 2024.
One limit defines how far the evidence reaches. The official migrant counts rest on descriptions of the counted population that differ from one another and are nowhere defined in the reviewed corpus, so no defensible per-migrant calculation can be built from them, and no reviewed source carries a composition split for Tajikistan. The measurable change is in instruments and in source countries, not in the migrant population the reported pairing invokes.
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Where Kazakhstan's Minerals Actually Go: Upstream and Midstream Destinations Diverge, but Not Uniformly
Policy discussions often treat mineral exports as an aggregate flow, obscuring whether ore and processed products reach the same buyers. Using Kazakhstan's self-reported 2024 UN Comtrade exports for 11 six-digit HS codes across seven minerals, this article compares destinations across processing stages. Chromium and lead show the clearest divergence: chromite ore went entirely to Russia (USD 113.7 million), while ferro-chromium went mainly to China (56.7%), Japan (19.9%), Indonesia (6.3%) and the United States (5.5%); lead ore went 99.9% to China, while refined lead went 71.7% to Viet Nam. Copper showed a partial shift, whereas zinc's ore and unwrought stages went mainly to China and Russia. Titanium, beryllium and tantalum were observed at one stage only and had different leading destinations. The results show commodity-specific destination patterns that aggregate indicators conceal. The comparison is descriptive and rests on Kazakhstan's declarations. The only usable bilateral comparison, for ferro-chromium, differs by 63.3% in value between Kazakhstan's export and China's import record; the cause is unresolved. For refined copper, partner quantities reconcile through altQty because aggregate qty is zero and netWgt is null. These limits do not establish rerouting or misreporting. Partner shares reconcile to the World totals; they describe reported destinations, not final consumption. -
Directional Asymmetry and One-Sided Records in Central Asia's Cross-Border Electricity Exchange, 2019–2024
Regional electricity plans assume that cross-border trade can expand, but the public record first has to show who reports which flows. This article examines declared bilateral electricity trade (HS 271600) from 2019 to 2024 among five Central Asian states and Russia, China, Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. It classifies each reporter-year-flow cell as positive, explicit zero, absent commodity row or uncovered. Of 60 Central Asian cells, 42 contain positive records; 65 of the 132 cells in the wider design were never queried; nine were resolved by a year-level check, and the remaining 56 stay in a separate coverage state. The reported network is concentrated: Kazakhstan sourced 97.5?99.8% of its electricity imports from Russia throughout the panel; Uzbekistan sent 78.3% of its 2024 exports to Afghanistan and sourced 84.7% of its imports from Turkmenistan; Tajikistan sent 59.2% of its 2023 exports to Afghanistan. Coverage limits these comparisons. Among 120 ordered Central Asian pair-years, 35 have a record on one side only; in 23, the silent reporter filed other electricity records that year. Where both sides report the same flow, values agree within USD 1 in only three of 25 cases. The series show substantial directional asymmetries, including importer reports 8.0?51.1% below Tajikistan's exports to Uzbekistan, but missing records do not establish zero trade. Estimated quantities and rounded unit values also prevent treating calculated unit values as prices.