Volume 10 (2026) — 2026 Q2
Research Articles
-
Sovereignty Settled Once, Use Rights Carved Out by Object: How the 2025 Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan Border Package Combined Territory, Movement, Water and Resettlement
Background. On 13 March 2025 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed sixteen documents settling their last contested boundary sections, usually discussed as one treaty.
Main body. Object by object, this article asks what the package did to territorial title, road passage, shared water infrastructure and transferred settlements' residents, across 29 arrangements in six classes, on material published before 1 May 2026. Title moved once for the whole line, a net 793.0 hectares to Kyrgyzstan across six transfer entries, yet none of the fourteen territorial objects has an object-level transfer record. Two crossing points reopened on the day of signature, two air links within three days; one of three roads is under construction. A bilateral water commission met once, on 9 October 2025; neither water facility has a documented act. A domestic programme built 257 houses at three sites: 181 families were reported moved into the new Chet-Bulak village, where the same report saw empty houses, and by 29 November all Leilek families due to relocate were in the 76 Razzakov and Maksat houses. Dostuk households received 20 sotka, four times the 5-sotka quota announced there, the other five settlements 10 sotka with no quota located for them. Crop compensation at Zhany-Dostuk was unpaid.
Conclusion. Six of the 29 arrangements had a documented act of the kind their class admits, eighteen a legal act only. Separating land sovereignty from facility use is established regional practice, the third case strictly and the sixth broadly; the commission statute omits the individual water use right its closest precedent reportedly states.
-
Tighter Enforcement, Larger Remittances: What Actually Changed in 2024 Flows to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan
In 2024 Russian authorities intensified checks, raids, and deportations directed at Central Asian labor migrants, while official statistics recorded double-digit growth in US-dollar remittance receipts: +45.5 percent for Tajikistan, +29.8 percent for Uzbekistan, and +18.6 percent net and +10.5 percent gross for Kyrgyzstan. Contemporary reporting paired that growth with a reported halving of the registered Kyrgyz migrant population in Russia and explained it by wage gains among those who stayed. We ask what pre-cutoff evidence establishes about that pairing for each country.
The composition of recorded flows changed, in instruments and in geography. Using primary monthly and channel data from the Central Bank of Uzbekistan, we difference the 2024 increment rather than approximate it. The channel levels the bank publishes directly show that peer-to-peer card transfers supplied 58.2 percent of the USD 3.424 billion increase, against 29.9 percent for traditional money-transfer systems and 11.9 percent for SWIFT, with no recorded channel contracting. In the two countries whose reviewed sources carry a source-country split, Russia's recorded share fell while its absolute contribution rose; the Kyrgyz series runs across 2020, 2022 and 2024, the Uzbek comparison across 2023 and 2024.
One limit defines how far the evidence reaches. The official migrant counts rest on descriptions of the counted population that differ from one another and are nowhere defined in the reviewed corpus, so no defensible per-migrant calculation can be built from them, and no reviewed source carries a composition split for Tajikistan. The measurable change is in instruments and in source countries, not in the migrant population the reported pairing invokes.