Volume 10 (2026) — 2026 Q2
Commentary
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Who Pays and When: Transposition, Elected Delay and the Side-by-Side Arrangement in the Global Minimum Tax, 2022 to 2026
Public trackers of the OECD's Pillar Two global minimum tax report how many jurisdictions have legislation. That count is blind to the two variables that fix a taxpayer's position: which jurisdiction collects the top-up tax, and from which fiscal year. Reading the operative provisions of three mechanisms that shaped European and United States practice between 2022 and 1 May 2026, this commentary finds that the Directive's Article 50 election, notified by five member states as a six-year delay, starts the Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) a year early for the groups it covers. Article 50(1) derogates from Articles 5 to 14 alone. Article 50(2) requires the other member states to charge those groups the UTPR amount allocated to them for fiscal years beginning 31 December 2023. Article 56 carves that arrangement out of the one-year postponement it grants every other group. The relocation is conditional: it operates where the group has constituent entities in other member states and a residual remains after any qualified domestic minimum top-up tax. The same reading separates transposition, notification, escalation, case closure and recorded qualified status, which the enforcement record runs together, and dates the Side-by-Side arrangement's allocation: one listed jurisdiction on 5 January 2026, a domestic minimum top-up tax that survives only in the jurisdictions that levy one, and qualified Side-by-Side status open to other jurisdictions on a request made in 2027 or 2028. Reporting the charging jurisdiction and the first covered fiscal year would record what a count cannot.
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Before the Committee Sits: Decomposing Restructuring Delay in Zambia and Ghana, with a Comparative Note on Sri Lanka
Zambia's and Ghana's routes to an Official Creditor Committee (OCC) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under the G20 Common Framework (CF) differ by 524 days (17.2 months): 35.0 months for Zambia against 17.8 for Ghana. Using exact-day, same-level milestones, 436 of those 524 days, 83.2% of the gap, accrued before either country's committee had formed. Of Zambia's own 580 pre-committee days, 500 (86%) elapsed after Zambia had already applied for CF treatment, inside the observed application-to-committee interval. This pre-committee share is the majority of the gap under every definition tested, from 77.6% to 84.9%, depending on the official-track endpoint and on which of Ghana's trigger dates is used. Case-study literature has argued the CF's sequencing rule "clearly delayed" Zambia's restructuring (Grigorian & Bhayana, 2024, p. 21); this commentary's decomposition allocates most of the observed Zambia-Ghana gap to the pre-committee interval rather than the post-committee negotiation stage the sequencing rule most directly governs, and it does not identify a mechanism or causal effect. This quantified, definition-sensitive account is not provided by the nearest comparator that groups all three, Chen and Hart (2025), only qualitatively, as three restructurings concluded by 2024. Sri Lanka, outside the CF, is reported alongside as a third descriptive case. Three cases cannot identify the CF's causal effect, and this commentary does not attempt to.
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Deferred Enforcement, Applicable Reporting: The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice in the EU AI Act's Enforcement Interval
The EU AI Act's general-purpose AI provider obligations became applicable on 2 August 2025; Article 113 provides that the Commission's Chapter IX supervision and enforcement powers, and Article 101 on fines, apply from 2 August 2026. The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice was published into that interval. This article asks what adherence could do for a provider, and non-adherence do to one, during those 365 days, reading the answer off the statute and the signing arrangements rather than off signature counts. It identifies six consequences the Commission publicly attached to signing. Five operate wholly through Chapter IX, Section 5 or Article 101 and were unexercisable throughout; the sixth is partly an enforcement posture under Article 89(1), unexercisable for the same reason, and partly a reputational effect that no provision of the Regulation confers or withholds. Articles 56(5) and 56(6) sit in Chapter V and applied from 2 August 2025: participants report regularly to the AI Office on the implementation of their commitments, and the AI Office and the Board monitor and evaluate their achievement of the Code's objectives. The Code's Commitment 7 is grounded in Article 56(5) and sets a six-month Model Report cycle for the most capable models, which the Commission's adequacy Opinion assesses. Signature therefore allocated an applicable reporting and monitoring relationship that non-signature did not, rather than the enforcement-dependent benefits. Three adherence patterns were observable by the 1 May 2026 cutoff; the article establishes no provider's Article 111(3) transition status, no systemic-risk classification and no provider's reasons.