Skip to main content
Academy of Public Policy and Economics
Academy of Public Policy and Economics
ISSN 3006-6220 (Online) · Quarterly · Open Access (CC BY 4.0)
Commentary

Capitalizing Innovation and Reversing It: Mandatory R&D Tax Amortization, Cash-Tax Drains, and Corporate Investment Across the 2022–2025 U.S. Policy Cycle

  1. 1 Academy of Public Policy and Economics

Abstract

When corporate tax statutes defer immediate expensing of intangible investment into multi-year amortization and subsequently restore expensing, user-cost theory predicts a two-sided liquidity pulse concentrated among taxable research-intensive firms. We evaluate this timing-wedge hypothesis across the 2022–2024 mandatory capitalization of research and experimental expenditures under Internal Revenue Code Section 174 and the 2025 domestic expensing restoration under Section 174A. From 4,662 U.S.-incorporated non-financial, non-utility annual corporate filers (40,292 annual periods observed in filings submitted through November 12, 2026), we construct an accounting-corroborated continuous research panel of 586 firms (4,688 firm-years) that eliminates reverse-merger balance-sheet mismatches, alongside an 802-firm date-matched comparison panel. Among firms with positive pre-policy operating income (N = 961, 153 firms, 12 two-digit industries), the conditional slope of net cash income taxes over beginning assets on pre-policy research intensity is +0.0527 during mandatory amortization (SE = 0.0519; restricted wild cluster bootstrap p = 0.2852) and +0.0140 during initial 2025 restoration (SE = 0.0417; bootstrap p = 0.7021), yielding an imprecise reversal contrast of -0.0387 (SE = 0.0357; bootstrap p = 0.2112); omitting a single extreme-hat-value medical-instruments issuer raises the amortization slope to +0.1043 (SE = 0.0219; bootstrap p = 0.0660) and the 2025 slope to +0.0509, while revenue-scaled (+0.1326, bootstrap p = 0.012) and pre-refund gross (+0.1094, bootstrap p = 0.032) cash-tax slopes are positive. Exact unclipped accounting decompositions show that the cash-less-accrued tax wedge widens by +0.1444 in amortization and +0.1575 in 2025 (baseline winsorized slopes +0.1305, bootstrap p = 0.2425, and +0.1329, bootstrap p = 0.0208, or +1.31 and +1.33 percentage points of assets per 10-percentage-point higher research intensity), reflecting positive contemporaneous-income-adjusted cash-tax slopes (+0.0916 and +0.0938) alongside post-2020 earnings mean reversion in book tax accruals, whereas current federal tax expense exhibits a triple-difference reversal contrast of -0.0557 (SE = 0.0194; bootstrap p = 0.020; N = 1,906). Post-2021 research (-0.1682) and capital-expenditure (-0.0324) slopes follow pre-policy upward trends, attenuate under a 2016–2017 exposure anchor (-0.0503, N = 1,216), and show a positive low-cash research interaction (+0.2419, bootstrap p = 0.044), consistent with consolidated jurisdictional aggregation and mid-year enactment timing attenuating observable statutory tax-shield shocks.

Figures Click any figure to enlarge
Figure 1. Dynamic event-study slopes on pre-policy research intensity across fiscal-start years 2018–2025 (normalized to 2021 = 0) among firms with positive pre-policy operating income.
Figure 2. Micro-level cash-tax shifts, constant-roster versus all-reporter empirical cumulative distributions, and balanced cross-sectional variance decomposition.
Figure 3. Real investment dynamics, specification and reporter-balance checks, and active-industry or hat-value exclusion diagnostics.

Data Availability & Replication

Structured annual corporate financial disclosures and statutory or regulatory tax texts examined in this article derive from public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission alongside official publications of the U.S. Government Publishing Office, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. The complete firm-year panels, archived source inputs, accounting audit outputs, and replication code are publicly archived on Zenodo under persistent identifier https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24200049.

Replication Archive DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24200049 (33.05 MB, CC BY 4.0)

Declarations

AI declaration
During the preparation of this study, OpenAI Codex was utilized exclusively to support structured filing-data harmonization and implementation-level auditing of statistical scripts. All assisted procedures were independently verified by each author; the conceptual framing, empirical interpretation, and manuscript text were written by the authors, who assume full responsibility for the work.
Funding
This research received institutional support from the Academy of Public Policy and Economics (APPE). No external grants were received.
Competing interests
Natalie Goh, Farhod Rakhimov, and Pavel Rogovtsev are affiliated with the Academy of Public Policy and Economics, which publishes Commentary and Critique. No external competing interests are declared.
References 38 references
  1. Akcigit, U., Grigsby, J., Nicholas, T., & Stantcheva, S. (2022). Taxation and innovation in the twentieth century. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(1), 329-385. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab022
  2. Akcigit, U., Hanley, D., & Stantcheva, S. (2022). Optimal taxation and R&D policies. Econometrica, 90(2), 645-684. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15445
  3. Akcigit, U., Baslandze, S., & Stantcheva, S. (2016). Taxation and the international mobility of inventors. American Economic Review, 106(10), 2930-2981. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150237
  4. Dechezleprêtre, A., Einiö, E., Martin, R., Nguyen, K. T., & Van Reenen, J. (2023). Do tax incentives increase firm innovation? An RD design for R&D, patents, and spillovers. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(4), 486-521. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200739
  5. Agrawal, A., Rosell, C., & Simcoe, T. (2020). Tax credits and small firm R&D spending. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12(2), 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140467
  6. Guceri, I., & Liu, L. (2019). Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for R&D: Quasi-experimental evidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(1), 266-291. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170403
  7. Rao, N. (2016). Do tax credits stimulate R&D spending? The effect of the R&D tax credit in its first decade. Journal of Public Economics, 140, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.05.003
  8. Hall, B. H., & Van Reenen, J. (2000). How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review of the evidence. Research Policy, 29(4-5), 449-469. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0048-7333(99)00085-2
  9. Bloom, N., Griffith, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2002). Do R&D tax credits work? Evidence from a panel of countries 1979–1997. Journal of Public Economics, 85(1), 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00086-x
  10. Lucking, B., Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2019). Have R&D spillovers declined in the 21st century? Fiscal Studies, 40(4), 561-590. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12195
  11. Becker, B. (2015). Public R&D policies and private R&D investment: A survey of the empirical evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(5), 917-942. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12074
  12. Chen, Z., Liu, Z., Suárez Serrato, J. C., & Xu, D. Y. (2021). Notching R&D investment with corporate income tax cuts in China. American Economic Review, 111(7), 2065-2100. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191758
  13. Cui, W., Hicks, J., & Xing, J. (2022). Cash on the table? Imperfect take-up of tax incentives and firm investment behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 208, 104632. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104632
  14. Zwick, E., & Mahon, J. (2017). Tax policy and heterogeneous investment behavior. American Economic Review, 107(1), 217-248. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140855
  15. House, C. L., & Shapiro, M. D. (2008). Temporary investment tax incentives: Theory with evidence from bonus depreciation. American Economic Review, 98(3), 737-768. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.737
  16. Ohrn, E. (2018). The effect of corporate taxation on investment and financial policy: Evidence from the DPAD. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(2), 272-301. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150378
  17. Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 61-82. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.1.61
  18. Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2-3), 127-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002
  19. Dobridge, C. L. (2021). Tax loss carrybacks as firm fiscal stimulus: A tale of two recessions. The Accounting Review, 96(6), 153-181. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0371
  20. Brown, J. R., Fazzari, S. M., & Petersen, B. C. (2009). Financing innovation and growth: Cash flow, external equity, and the 1990s R&D boom. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 151-185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01431.x
  21. Brown, J. R., Martinsson, G., & Petersen, B. C. (2012). Do financing constraints matter for R&D? European Economic Review, 56(8), 1512-1529. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.007
  22. Himmelberg, C. P., & Petersen, B. C. (1994). R&D and internal finance: A panel study of small firms in high-tech industries. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(1), 38-51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2109824
  23. Hall, B. H. (2002). The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(1), 35-51. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/18.1.35
  24. Fazzari, S. M., & Petersen, B. C. (1993). Working capital and fixed investment: New evidence on financing constraints. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3), 328-342. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555961
  25. Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (2000). Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful: A comment on Kaplan and Zingales. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), 695-705. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554773
  26. Bond, S., Harhoff, D., & Van Reenen, J. (2005). Investment, R&D and financial constraints in Britain and Germany. Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, 79/80, 433-460. https://doi.org/10.2307/20777584
  27. Bond, S. R., & Söderbom, M. (2013). Conditional investment-cash flow sensitivities and financing constraints. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(1), 112-136. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01102.x
  28. Liu, P., & Liu, Y. (2025). Tax uncertainty, cash holdings and corporate investment. Finance Research Letters, 85, 108272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2025.108272
  29. Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for inference with clustered errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414-427. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.90.3.414
  30. MacKinnon, J. G., Nielsen, M. Ø., & Webb, M. D. (2023). Fast and reliable jackknife and bootstrap methods for cluster‐robust inference. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 38(5), 671-694. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2969
  31. United States Congress. (2017). An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018 (Public Law 115-97, Section 13206: Amortization of research and experimental expenditures). United States Statutes at Large, 131, 2054-2113. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ97/html/PLAW-115publ97.htm
  32. United States Congress. (2025). Public Law 119-21, Section 70302: Full expensing of domestic research and experimental expenditures (Internal Revenue Code Section 174A). United States Statutes at Large, 139. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ21/html/PLAW-119publ21.htm
  33. Internal Revenue Service. (2025). Revenue Procedure 2025-28: Procedures for elections and accounting method changes under Section 174A and transition rules for unamortized domestic research and experimental expenditures. Internal Revenue Bulletin, 2025-38. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-25-28.pdf
  34. Internal Revenue Service. (2023). Notice 2023-63: Guidance on amortization of specified research or experimental expenditures under Section 174. Internal Revenue Bulletin, 2023-39, 919-936. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-23-63.pdf
  35. U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025). Election of year consisting of 52-53 weeks and effective-date conventions (26 C.F.R. Section 1.441-2). Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26, 8. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2025-title26-vol8/html/CFR-2025-title26-vol8-sec1-441-2.htm
  36. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026). EDGAR company facts and annual Form 10-K structured financial disclosures. Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https://www.sec.gov/edgar/sec-api-documentation
  37. Internal Revenue Service. (2024). Notice 2024-12: Clarification and modification of Notice 2023-63 regarding specified research or experimental expenditures under Section 174. Internal Revenue Bulletin, 2024-5, 616-620. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-24-12.pdf
  38. Financial Accounting Standards Board. (2023). Accounting Standards Update No. 2023-09, Income Taxes (Topic 740): Improvements to income tax disclosures. https://www.fasb.org/standards/accounting-standards-updates